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Is a Trial Before a Non-Attorney
Judge Constitutional?
Young v. Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276,
558 P.2d 791 (1977).
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts of limited jurisdiction or courts which are presided over
by justices of the peace originated in England in the fourteenth
century.' In Washington, as in a great number of other states, this
lay system of justice still exists, with non-attorney judges or jus-
tices of the peace presiding over the courtroom proceedings. Some
state legislatures have recently abolished the system2 and other
states prohibit a non-attorney judge from hearing a case where a
prison sentence could be imposed.3 This note will examine the con-
stitutionality of the Washington State system.
In Washington, there is a basic constitutional and statutory
framework which sets out the requirements to be met in order to
become a justice of the peace. Article IV4 of the state constitution
deals with the judicial power of the state and expressly provides
that justice courts may be provided for by the legislature.5 Section
1. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d 323, 327, 525 P.2d 72, 74, 115 Cal.'
Rptr. 632, 634 (1974).
2. The Kentucky and Utah legislatures recently abolished the justice of
the peace judicial system even though their respective systems were
found to be constitutional in North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976) and
Shelmidine v. Jones, 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976).
3. See generally 47 AM. JUR. 2d Justices of the Peace § 49 (1969); Annot.,
71 A.L.R.3d 498 (1976); Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 562 (1976).
4. "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court,
superior courts, justices of the peace, and such inferior courts as the
legislature may provide." WASH. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
5. The legislature shall determine the number of justices of the
peace to be elected in incorporated cities or towns and in pre-
cincts, and shall prescribe by law the powers, duties and juris-
diction of justices of the peace; Provided, that such jurisdiction
granted by the legislature shall not trench upon the jurisdic-
tion of superior or other courts of record, except that justices
of the peace may be made police justices of incorporated cities
and towns. In incorporated cities or towns having more than
five thousand inhabitants the justices of the peace shall re-
ceive such salary as may be provided by law, and shall re-
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17 of Article IV" specifically states that superior and supreme court
judges must be members of the bar, but the constitution is silent
regarding the qualifications of lay justices. It has been inferred
from this silence that they need not be members of the state bar.
Aside from the state constitutional basis of this system, the legis-
lature has set forth a statutory scheme outlining the lay system
of justice. In cities with a population greater than 5,000, the judges
in courts of limited jurisdiction must be attorneys.7  However, if
the population is less than 5,000, the judge is not required to be
an attorney.8 In districts with a population of less than 10,000, a
non-attorney may become a judge if he passes an examination, 9 al-
though this examination is usually not taken by non-lawyer district
judges. 10 The statutory scheme also provides for an appeal from
a justice court to a superior court which has an attorney judge.
This appeal is in the form of de novo review. 1
Young v. Konz,12 was a consolidation of two cases, both of which
were misdemeanor trials heard before non-attorney judges. The
non-attorney judges were granted the authority to hand down prison
sentences, and the appellants contended that this power deprived
them of due process.1 3 The central issue in Young was, therefore,
whether due process is denied when a case is heard before a non-
attorney judge who has the power to hand down a prison sentence,
in view of the fact that an appeal de novo to a superior court is
an automatic right. An equal protection issue was also raised as
a result of the fact that the statutes provided for non-attorney
judges solely on the basis of the population of the city or the dis-
trict.
14
II. THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority
The statutory framework in Washington differs from that in
ceive no fees for their own use.
WASH. CONsT. art. IV, § 10.
6. "No person shall be eligible to the office of judge of the supreme court,
or judge of a superior court, unless he shall have been admitted to
practice in the courts of record of this state, or of the Territory of
Washington." WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 17.
7. WASH. REV. CODE § 3.12.071 (1961).
8. WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.040 (Supp. 1976).
9. Id. § 3.34.060.
10. Young v. Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276, 285-86, 558 P.2d 791, 796 (1977)
(Utter, J., dissenting).
11. WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.410 (Supp. 1976).
12. 88 Wash. 2d 276, 558 P.2d 791 (1977).
13. Id. at 279-80, 558 P.2d at 792.
14. Id. at 283, 558 P.2d at 794.
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other states, where a de novo trial is allowed on appeal whether
or not the defendant pleaded guilty in the lower court. The ques-
tion in Young was whether this difference in statutes was crucial
enough to result in a denial of due process to defendants whose
cases were heard in Washington justice courts. The Washington
Supreme Court held that it was not.15
Although there have been a great number of cases concerning
the constitutionality of justice of the peace courts, the court in
Young focused on three of the major opinions in this area and
used them as the basis for its opinion. The first case that the court
focused on was Gordon v. Justice Court 6 where the California
Supreme Court found that proceedings before a non-attorney judge
were a denial of due process. The Washington Supreme Court put
very little emphasis on Gordon and it was dismissed as having little
importance in light of the fact that the United States Supreme
Court had subsequently ruled on the question with regard to a
similar Kentucky statute.
17
After the discussion of Gordon, the court in Young focused on
Shelmidine v. Jones,18 where the Utah Supreme Court upheld a
lay system of justice. The court in Young did not discuss whether
the Utah and Washington statutes were similar; instead, the court
emphasized the language in the Utah opinion which indicated that
it was the province of the legislature and not the courts to make
such sweeping changes concerning the courts of limited jurisdic-
tion.19 This appeared to be one of the major reasons why the court
refused to act. The court should have made a detailed comparison
of the statutes and the systems involved; but the court felt that
a strong element of separation of powers was present, and there-
fore left the decision to the legislature.
The third major case the majority dealt with was North v.
Russell,"0 a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld
the lay system of justice in Kentucky. The Washington Supreme
Court stated that because of North, Gordon was no longer persua-
sive authority.
2 1
North was therefore used as the controlling authority. The
court in Young noted that North held that the right to an attorney
22
15. Id.
16. 12 Cal. 3d 323, 525 P.2d 72, 115 Cal. Rptr. 632 (1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 938 (1975).
17. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
18. 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976).
19. 88 Wash. 2d at 281-82, 558 P.2d at 793.
20. 427 U.S. 328 (1976).
21. 88 Wash. 2d at 280, 558 P.2d at 793.
22. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
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was not violated merely because the case was heard before a lay
judge. In its discussion of North, the Washington Supreme Court
mentioned that the Kentucky system provided for a trial de novo
after a plea of guilty or not guilty, whereas in Washington, a trial
de novo is only available after a plea of not guilty.23 The court
said that this difference was not important enough for Young to
be distinguished from North. When a defendant pleads guilty, he
automatically waives his right to appeal, 24 except if collateral issues
are also raised.25 In this way, the defendant is protected from mak-
ing an unknowing or involuntary plea. His due process rights are
not violated just because he does not receive an automatic de novo
trial.
After its brief discussion of these other cases concerning the con-
stitutionality of justice courts, the Washington court concluded that
due process is not violated when a defendant is tried before a non-
attorney judge.26 This was found to be true even though a plea of
guilty will not result in a de novo trial.
B. The Dissent
The dissent began with a practical view of the system and noted
that "many defendants charged with traffic or other offenses heard
in the courts here at issue cannot afford either the time or money
to avail themselves of a de novo appeal. '27  Although this system
is supposed to have a built-in check, in the form of a de novo trial
on any errors the justice court judge may have made, in reality
this check may not be available. This practical objection was
viewed from a constitutional perspective in Ward v. Village of
Monroeville 2 8 where the United States Supreme Court recognized
that "the State's trial court procedure [cannot] be deemed constitu-
tionally acceptable simply because the State eventually offers a de-
fendant an impartial adjudication. '29 The dissent in Young argued
that a lay judge is not impartial, cannot understand the intricacies
of the law, and therefore the case should have been heard before
an attorney judge in the first instance. Having a de novo trial
available on appeal does not erase the fact that the defendant was
denied due process in the lower court.
23. See WASH. REV. CODE § 3.50.370, 3.50.410 (Supp. 1976).
24. State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212 P. 551 (1923).
25. If the defendant questions the validity of the statute, the court's juris-
diction or the circumstances under which he made the plea, he can
appeal from a plea of guilty. See Fisher v. Bowman, 57 Wash. 2d 535,
358 P.2d 316 (1961).
26. 88 Wash. 2d at 283, 558 P.2d at 794.
27. Id. at 284, 558 P.2d at 795 (Utter, J., dissenting).
28. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
29. Id. at 61.
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The dissent in Young also relied on North, but read it differ-
ently than did the majority. "Under the Kentucky system . . .
a defendant can have an initial trial before an attorney judge by
pleading guilty in the police court, thus bypassing that court and
seeking a de novo trial, 'erasing . . .any consequence that would
otherwise follow from tendering the [guilty] plea.' "0 The major-
ity felt that the fact that the Kentucky statute provided for a de
novo trial on appeal after a plea of guilty was insignificant. The
dissent felt that this difference was crucial and that North should
not have been followed simply because the facts were similar. With
a different reading of North, the dissent's analysis of the constitu-
tionality of non-attorney judges was arguably better and reached
a preferred result.
III. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
A. Precedents
The analysis and reasoning of the court in Young was incom-
plete. The court should have compared the other statutory systems
in other states to see if they were comparable and could be used
as a basis for the decision. A great number of state courts which
have considered the question have found the fact that a judge has
not been trained to be an attorney does not violate due process.
31
A closer analysis of the cases considered and rejected by the
Washington Supreme Court demonstrates that the reasoning did not
mandate the. outcome in Young. The important factor in Young
was that the court considered it to be the province of the legislature
to abolish courts with non-attorney judges. This was evident from
the court's extensive quotation from the Utah case, Shelmidine v.
Jones.3 2 In Utah, as in Washington, a justice of the peace may im-
pose jail sentences, and the court in Shelmidine indicated that non-
attorney judges serve a useful purpose in sparsely populated rural
areas.3 3  The difficulty in comparing the two state systems, how-
ever, is that in Utah a person who is charged with an offense which
could result in a jail sentence has the right to request that the pro-
ceeding be presided over by an attorney judge. This alternative
30. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. at 337.
31. See State v. Lynch, 107 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 697 (1971); City of Decatur
v. Kushmer, 43 Ill. 2d 334, 253 N.E.2d 425 (1969); State v. Lindgren,
235 N.W.2d 379 (Minn. 1975); In re Application of Hewith, 81 Misc. 2d
202, 365 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1975); Thomas v. Justice Court, 538 P.2d 42
(Wyo. 1975); Crouch v. Justice of Peace -Court, 7 Ariz. App. 460, 440
P.2d 1000 (1968).
32. 550 P.2d 207 (Utah 1976).
33. Id. at 211.
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is not present in the Washington system. Therefore, the court in
Young was mistaken in relying on Shelmidine as an authority for
upholding the lay system of justice in Washington. This was a dis-
tinct difference which the court chose to ignore. The importance
of Shelmidine was that the Utah Supreme Court felt that the legis-
lature should abolish the lay courts; its value as a precedent was
not because of the fact that there was a similarity between the two
systems.
Although an equal protection argument was raised in Young,
it was summarily disposed of by citing North, where the United
States Supreme Court upheld the state's right to establish different
court systems for different areas classified by population. In com-
ing to this conclusion, North relied on an 1879 case, Missouri v.
Lewis.34 If the court in Young had looked at the reasoning
behind the holding in North, it could have arrived at the conclusion
that justice systems which are classified according to population
may no longer be reasonable in view of the fact that there are now
greater numbers of attorneys available in rural areas. The classifi-
cation may have been valid in the past when attorneys were scarce,
but the court should have looked at the present situation to deter-
mine if a reasonable basis for the classification actually exists.
In considering North, the Washington Supreme Court minimized
the difference which existed between the Washington statutes and
those of Kentucky. A de novo trial after a plea of guilty or not
guilty is provided for in Kentucky,35 but a de novo trial is avail-
able to the defendant in Washington only if he pleads not guilty
in the justice court.36 This difference was cited as being of no sig-
nificance, and North was therefore Lited as controlling. This logic
could have been used if the court had been consistent in its compari-
sons but it was not used when comparing the California system.
California does not provide for a de novo trial after an initial trial in
the justice court; 37 the only remedy is an appeal. This is true after
either a plea of guilty or not guilty. In Gordon,38 the California
Supreme Court said that if the defendant waived his right to an
attorney judge, it would be permissible for a non-attorney judge
to hear the case. The differences in the Washington and California
appeals systems are quite clear.
As was stated earlier, in Kentucky there is a trial de novo
34. 101 U.S. 22 (1879).
35. 88 Wash. 2d at 283, 558 P.2d at 794.
36. Id.
37. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d at 331, 525 P.2d at 77, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 637.
38. Id.
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whether or not the defendant pleads guilty.39 In California, there
is a right of appeal" and in Washington, a trial de novo may only
be had after a plea of not guilty.4 1 In comparing these three sys-
tems, the court in Young found the difference between the Wash-
ington and Kentucky systems to be inconsequential. However, the
court could have reasoned that there were similarities between the
Washington and California systems and reached a completely differ-
ent result. An analysis of the reasoning or a comparison to the
California system would have made the opinion clearer and better
reasoned.
The court in Young could have included this analysis in its dis-
cussion of the Washington system, which, as stated earlier, provides
for a trial de novo only after the defendant has entered a plea of
not guilty in the justice court.4 2 The trial de novo is designed to
protect against any possible due process violations. In a trial de
novo, the case is tried as if there were no trial in the justice court
43
and the defendant is therefore really being given two trials.44 Al-
though the defendant is protected against due process violations in
the justice court when he pleads not guilty, the due process problem
arises when he pleads guilty. A guilty plea can be withdrawn only
on a clear showing of abuse, or to correct a manifest injustice.
45
Once a plea of guilty is entered, an appeal is precluded 46 except
if collateral questions are also raised.47 In circumstances where the
guilty plea should not have been accepted, a new trial can be had
by the defendant. The court in Young considered the appeals sys-
tem sufficient to protect the defendant from due process violations,
and concluded that the lack of a de novo trial after a plea of guilty
was constitutional.
48
One factor which should insure that a guilty plea was volun-
tarily given is the right to an attorney. The United States Supreme
39. 88 Wash. 2d at 283, 558 P.2d at 794.
40. Gordon v. Justice Court, 12 Cal. 3d at 331, 525 P.2d at 77, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 637.
41. 88 Wash. 2d at 283, 558 P.2d at 794.
42. WASH. Rsv. CODE § 3.50.410 (Supp. 1976).
43. State v. Hagimori, 57 Wash. 623, 107 P. 855 (1910); Stone v. Miracle,
196 Okla. 42, 162 P.2d 534 (1945).
44. George v. Day, 69 Wash. 2d 836, 420 P.2d 677 (1966).
45. State v. Taylor, 83 Wash. 2d 594, 521 P.2d 699 (1974); State v. Olin-
stead, 70 Wash. 2d 116, 422 P.2d 312 (1966); State v. Armstead, 13
Wash. App. 59, 533 P.2d 147 (1975).
46. State v. Haddon, 179 Wash. 669, 38 P.2d 227 (1934); State v. Alberg,
156 Wash. 397, 287 P. 13 (1930); State v. Eckert, 123 Wash. 403, 212
P. 551 (1923).
47. Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 119 (1962).
48. 88 Wash. 2d at 283, 558 P.2d at 794.
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Court has established that a defendant has the right to an attorney
in misdemeanor trials49 and the justice court judges do have a duty
to inform the defendant of this right. In Washington, a defendant
has the right to an attorney in all cases where there is a possibility
that a loss of liberty will result.50 The fact that an attorney will
counsel the defendant helps to insure that a guilty plea is volun-
tarily and knowingly given. It is only when the right to an attor-
ney is waived that there is a possibility of abuse. Following this
line of reasoning the appeal from a guilty plea was seen to be a
sufficient protection by the Washington Supreme Court. 51
It has been argued that the right to an attorney is meaningless
without the right to an attorney judge, who can understand and
properly rule on the attorney's motions and arguments.52 North,
Young, and other courts have rejected this argument on the basis
that "the judge is not one of the accused's adversaries and is not
there to defend or prosecute him. So the fact that the accused
needs a lawyer does not mean he needs to be tried before a
lawyer. '53 The dissent in North contended that when an attorney
argues before a non-attorney judge, the judge will turn to the
prosecutor for advice in ruling on a difficult question. 54 Even
though the courts have held that the right to an attorney does not
include the right to an attorney judge, the fact remains that the
judge may not be competent to rule on complex questions of law.
It would appear that this outcome would be a violation of due
process.
The court in Young was concerned with several major issues
and decided that due process is not violated when a non-attorney
judge hears a case. The court concluded that an appeal from a
guilty plea was sufficient to protect the defendant; however, the
court should have scrutinized the other cases more closely to
examine the reasoning behind the holdings.
IV. DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
A. Fundamental Fairness
One of the major objections to a non-attorney judge is that he
49. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
50. McInturf v. Horton, 85 Wash. 2d 704, 538 P.2d 499 (1975).
51. 88 Wash. 2d at 283, 558 P.2d at 794.
52. Note, Limiting Judicial Incompetence: The Due Process Right to a
Legally Learned Judge in State Minor Court Criminal Proceedings, 61
VA. L. REV. 1454, 1457 (1975).
53. Ditty v. Hampton, 490 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ky. 1972), appeal dismissed,
414 U.S. 885 (1973).
54. North v. Russell, 427 U.S. at 344 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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will not afford the defendant a fair trial. The issue, when consid-
ering due process, is not whether the defendant was actually
prejudiced but whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a par-
ticular procedure will result in prejudice to the defendant.55 In
looking at the procedures of the justice and superior courts, it is
to be noted that non-attorney judges did not convict more defend-
ants, impose higher fines or were reversed more on appeal than
attorney judges. 56
Another requirement of due process is that the defendant be
granted a fair and impartial trial.57 Whether a fair and impartial
trial is given in a justice court depends on whether the question
is analyzed from a legal perspective or from a layman's standpoint.
If fairness means only that the judge must be impartial and should
not be predisposed with the outcome of the case, then there is no
reason to find lay judges any more or less fair than attorney judges.
The fourteenth amendment does not guarantee a trial free from
error, but if the error borders on arbitrary action, then due process
is violated.58 There was no actual bias alleged on the part of the
judge in Young. If this perspective is used, then the defendant
did receive a fair trial before the non-attorney judge and due
process was not violated.
If, however, fairness is based on the judge's legal knowledge and
on the rulings he makes, then it is possible that due process will
be violated when a case is heard before a non-attorney judge. The
dissent in North"9 pointed out that a judge must accept guilty pleas,
rule on questions of search and seizure, advise the defendant of
his rights, and make certain that a confession is voluntary. -"A
judge ignorant of the law is simply incapable of performing these
functions. ' 60 If the judge cannot understand the finer legal points
needed to make a decision, then some of his decisions will be arbi-
trary when viewed within the framework of the legal system. As
seen from this perspective, a lay judge is not capable of safeguard-
ing a defendant's rights, and a fair trial cannot be had by a defend-
ant. Although the analysis of fairness as viewed from the perspec-
tive of the legal system is preferable, the courts have looked at
fairness by focusing on the impartiality of the judge, and in the
55. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
56. Brief for Appellant at 14-15, Young v. Konz, 88 Wash. 2d 276, 558 P.2d
791 (1977).
57. See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
58. Roberts v. New York City, 295 U.S. 264 (1935); Beck v. Washington,
369 U.S. 541 (1962).
59. 427 U.S. at 343-45 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 344.
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absence of prejudice, it has been found that due process was not
violated.
B. Due Process and the State Constitution
The wording of the United States Constitution and the Washing-
ton State Constitution is similar but not identical. 1 In construing
the state due process clause, the state court has basically three op-
tions: (1) it can follow the rule as set down by the United States
Supreme Court; (2) it can use a presumption that the United States
Supreme Court decisions construing the constitution will be fol-
lowed; or (3) it can look at the state claim independently.6 2 State
courts generally tend to follow the United States Supreme Court
decisions, but at times look to the state constitution as a basis for
providing more protection for the individual. 3 The state court does
not have the power to interpret the federal constitution more
strictly than the Supreme Court will allow, but the state court can
impose greater restrictions on police activity or procedures than
those which would be required to uphold the federal standards.
64
The federal guarantees are the minimums which must be followed
by the states. The Supreme Court acknowledged this position when
in referring to the New York special jury system it said:
Beyond requiring conformity to standards of fundamental fair-
ness that have won legal recognition, this Court always has been
careful not so to interpret this Amendment as to impose uniform
procedures ....
We adhere to this policy of self-restraint and will not use this
great centralizing Amendment to standardize the administration of
justice and stagnate local variations in practice.
65
This type of state constitutional analysis might have been applied
in the Young situation, but was not. The court followed the
Supreme Court's holding in North, when an actual review of the
state constitutional situation would have been preferable. Under
this approach, the court could have held that the minimum require-
ments to be adhered to would include the allowance of non-attor-
ney justices of the peace if a de novo trial is allowed after a plea
61. "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law." WASH. CoNsT. art. I, § 3. "[N]or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
62. Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 905-06 (1976).
63. Id. at 895. See also People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099,
119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d
880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
64. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
65. Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 294-95 (1947).
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of either guilty or not guilty. The more protective restrictions
which could be applied by a state court would allow the justice
courts to be abolished.
It could be argued that the Washington system does not meet
the federal minimum requirements because there is no provision
for a de novo trial after a plea of guilty. Although the court in
Young said the defendant is protected by his right to appeal, this
may be insufficient. He should have a right to a trial de novo,
and therefore, the justice system in Washington would appear to
violate a defendant's right to due process. If the court had used
this analysis, the justice courts could have been abolished; the legis-
lative authority would not have been impinged upon because the
justice courts were in violation of the state constitution's due
process clause.
V. CONCLUSION
The Washington Supreme Court in Young held that a case heard
by a non-attorney judge did not violate due process even though
there was no provision for a trial de novo after the defendant had
entered a plea of guilty in the justice court. The court did not
take the opportunity to analyze the situation in terms of state con-
stitutional grounds. The court indicated that it did think it would
be preferable to have all cases heard before attorney judges. As
a result of the court's inaction, change will have to come, if at all,
from the legislature.
Elaine G. Rollins '78

